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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH W. BOURGEOUS : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 981518-CA 
v. : District Court No. 98-0900810 
UTAH DEPARTMENT : Priority No. 15 
OF COMMERCE 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant, Keith W. Bourgeous, appeals from an order of Third Judicial District 
Court Judge Ronald E. Nehring, dismissing his complaint for judicial review of a 
informal administrative action for lack of jurisdiction based upon its untimely filing. The 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a)(1996). 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Department of Commerce disagrees with Appellant's statement of issues in 
his brief, and therefore it submits the following statement of issues, followed by the 
applicable standard of review: 
1. Does the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, specifically UUih Code Ann. § 
63-46b-13 (1988), preclude Agency Reconsideration in cases in which Agency Review 
was available? If so, was Agency Review available to the appellant? Standard of 
Review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes and rules is a question of law reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). Likewise, legislative 
intent is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Mitchell. 824 P.2d 469, 471-
72(UtahApp. 1991). 
2. Is the Department of Commerce estopped from raising the issue of the 
timeliness of the Appellant's complaint for judicial review based upon a notice of appeal 
rights contained in an order entered after Appellant's time period to seek judicial review 
had already expired? Standard of Review: The application of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact. The examination and interpretation of the 
common law legal standard is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. 
Jenkins. 840 P.2d 877, 778-79 (Utah 1992). The issue of whether Appellant relied upon 
the representation to his detriment is a question of fact and therefore reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
2 
3. Even if Agency Reconsideration was authorized by law, was the Appellant's 
request, coming more than 20 days after the Department's Order on Review, timely? If 
not, was the subsequent complaint for judicial review timely? Standard of Review: The 
trial court's interpretation of statutes and rules is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 2, 1997, Keith W. Bourgeous applied with the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce for licensure as 
a Professional Engineer. The application was denied by the Division in an informal 
administrative action on September 24, 1997 for "failure to document graduation from the 
required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering." (Addendum 1). Bourgeous 
requested Agency Review on October 21, 1997. (Addendum 2). An order on Agency 
Review was entered October 24, 1997, denying his request for Agency Review based 
upon his failure to comply with the rules governing Agency Review, and advising him of 
his right to seek judicial review within 30 days. (Addendum 3). Bourgeous requested the 
Agency Review be reopened on October 30, 1997. (Addendum 4). On November 4, 
1997, the Division denied this request for failure to state a basis upon which the request 
could be granted and again advised Bourgeous of his right to seek judicial review within 
30 days. (Addendum 5). Bourgeous again petitioned the Department, this time on 
3 
November 21,1997, for Agency Reconsideration. (Addendum 6). The Division denied 
this request on December 29, 1997, holding that Agency Reconsideration is statutorily 
precluded because Agency Review was available. (Addendum 7). On January 23, 1998, 
Bourgeous filed a complaint with the Third District Court seeking judicial review of the 
denial of licensure. (Addendum 8). Judge Ronald E. Nehring dismissed Bourgeous' 
complaint on July 22, 1998, for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint was filed late. 
(Addendum 9). Bourgeous filed his notice of appeal to this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 2, 1997, Appellant (hereafter "Bourgeous") applied with the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing (Division) of the Department of 
Commerce (Department) for licensure as a professional engineer. The application for 
licensure was denied by the Division on September 24, 1997 for "failure to document 
graduation from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering." 
(Addendum 1). 
On October 21, 1997, Bourgeous requested Agency Review with the Department 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1997) . (Addendum 2). On October 24,1997, 
the Department issued its Order on Review denying Bourgeous9 request for relief from 
the Division's denial of licensure for failing to comply with the rules governing Agency 
4 
Review. (Addendum 3). Contrary to Bourgeous' assertions to the trial court and now to 
this Court, the Order on Review complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-12(6)(c) (1997). The Order clearly dismissed Bourgeous' Request for Agency 
Review, and it informed Bourgeous of his right to seek judicial review and the time frame 
from which appeal must be taken. (The complete "Order on Review" is attached as 
Addendum 3). 
Although the Order on Review advised Bourgeous he could seek judicial review of 
the order within 30 days, he elected to file a unique request with the Department on 
October 30, 1997 to reopen Agency Review for consideration of information he failed to 
provide in the original request. (Addendum 4). The Department issued another order on 
November 4, 1997, denying Bourgeous' request to reopen Agency Review on the grounds 
he failed to state a basis upon which the request could be granted. This Order again 
informed Bourgeous of his right to seek judicial review within 30 days. (Addendum 5). 
Ignoring the two previous notices that he may seek judicial review, Bourgeous 
next petitioned the Department on November 21, 1997, for Agency Reconsideration, 
ostensibly pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997) and Utah Admin. Code § 
Rl 51 -46b-13(1997). (Addendum 6). The Department dismissed the request for Agency 
Reconsideration on December 29, 1997 for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997) and Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-13 (1997) expressly 
preclude Agency Reconsideration where Agency Review is available. (Addendum 7). 
5 
The Department found that Agency Review was available, that Bourgeous availed 
himself of Agency Review concerning the license denial (as evidenced by his October 21, 
1997 request for Agency Review and the Department's October 24, 1997 Order on 
Review), and therefore Agency Reconsideration was expressly precluded. (Id.) 
On January 23, 1998, Bourgeous filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court 
for judicial review challenging the merits of the Division's September 24, 1997 decision 
to deny his license application. (Addendum 8). Bourgeous' complaint did not challenge 
the Department's December 29, 1997 denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, nor the 
Department's November 4, 1997 refusal to reopen agency review. (Id.). On July 22, 
1998, Judge Ronald E. Nehring dismissed Bourgeous' complaint, ruling: 
Plaintiffs election to seek agency reconsideration does not act to toll 
the 30 day period in which he was required to file for judicial review in the 
district court since he had no right to seek reconsideration . . . . Plaintiffs 
Complaint requesting judicial review was filed on January 23, 1998, more 
than 30 days beyond the Department's [October 24, 1997] Order on 
Review. Accordingly, the Complaint was filed untimely and the Court is 
without jurisdiction to consider the matter. 
(Addendum 9). 
Bourgeous filed his notice of appeal to this Court on August 19, 1998. 
6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Agency reconsideration is expressly precluded where agency review is 
available. The legislative history of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act makes it 
clear that if agency review of the Department's order was available in the first instance, 
agency reconsideration is precluded. The interpretation of "unavailable" urged by 
Bourgeous, i.e., that "unavailable" includes "exhausted," is specious logic without 
support in case law and inconsistent with legislative history. The order on review was not 
defective or inadequate in any manner. It clearly notified Bourgeous of his right to 
judicially appeal within 30 days, yet he chose to file two more attempts at administrative 
review, neither of which were authorized by statute or rule. He thereafter filed a 
complaint for judicial review which was properly dismissed by the District Court for lack 
of jurisdiction because it was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the order on 
review, the final agency action. 
2. Equitable estoppel is legally and factually inapplicable. Bourgeous could not 
have possibly relied to his detriment on the appeal notice contained in the December 29, 
1997 order dismissing his unauthorized fequest for reconsideration, because it was issued 
more than a month after his right to judicial review expired. Bourgeous was advised in 
the Department's October 24, 1997 order on review of his right to judicial review within 
30 days and he chose to disregard the notice, instead filing a request to reopen review, not 
provided for in law, and a request for reconsideration, expressly precluded under these 
7 
circumstances by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The Department fulfilled its 
obligation to notify Bourgeous of his right to judicial appeal in its order on review, and it 
had no obligation to respond to his request for reconsideration. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, Bourgeous had a right to reconsideration, his request for 
reconsideration was untimely, making his request for judicial review untimely. In 
circumstances in which reconsideration is appropriate, the request must be made within 
20 days of entry of the final agency action. Although Bourgeous' request was made 
within 20 days of the order responding to his novel request to reopen review, that request 
was without basis in statute or rule and the resulting order dismissed the request for 
failure to state a basis for the request. He cannot toll the time period for filing the request 
for reconsideration by filing an intervening, improper request. Bourgeous' request for 
reconsideration was filed November 21, 1997, more than 20 days after the Department's 
October 24, 1997 order on review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT EXPRESSLY 
PROVIDES FOR AGENCY RECONSIDERATION ONLY WHERE AGENCY 
REVIEW IS UNAVAILABLE. AGENCY REVIEW REGARDING THE DIVISION'S 
DECISION WAS NOT ONLY AVAILABLE, BOURGEOUS AVAILED HIMSELF OF 
IT. 
The denial of an application for licensure by the Division of Occupational and 
8 
Professional Licensing is classified as an "informal adjudicative proceeding"1 under the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act2. "Agency Review," as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-12, is available through the Department of Commerce to any aggrieved party 
seeking relief from an informal adjudicative action, such as licensure denial, by simply 
filing a request for Agency Review within 30 days after the issuance of the order to be 
challenged.3 The Department is required by both statute and rule to issue a written 
"Order on Review" responding to the issues and claims for relief raised in the request for 
Agency Review.4 The Order on Review constitutes final agency action5 for purposes of 
the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies found in the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act.6 A party may seek de novo judicial review of a final agency action in 
the District Court after exhausting all available administrative remedies.7 The "party 
shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the date 
1
 Utah Admin. Code § R156-46b-202(l)(e) (1997). 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-0.5 (1997) et seq. 
3Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-12 (1997). 
4Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6) (1997) and Utah Admin. Code § Rl 51-46b-12(9) 
(1997). 
5
 Utah Admin. Code § Rl 51-46b-14(2) (1997). 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (1997). 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1997). 
9 
that the order constituting final agency action is issued. ..." (Emphasis added).8 
By the express terms of its definition, "Agency Reconsideration" is not available 
to challenge an order resulting from Agency Review. An aggrieved party may request 
Agency Reconsideration "[w]ithin 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 [Agency Review] 
is unavailable...." (Emphasis added).9 In other words, Agency Reconsideration is not 
available where Agency Review is. 
Moreover, the only example of Agency Reconsideration found in the Department's 
administrative rules is in cases where the aggrieved party is challenging an order or 
decision entered by the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Board.10 
Because Agency Review is not available as to any order or decision entered by that 
Board,11 Agency Reconsideration is the form of administrative appeal. With the 
exception of the decisions of that one board, Agency Review is the exclusive 
administrative remedy available to challenge licensure denials before any other 
professional licensing Board of the Department of Commerce.12 As such, with the 
8
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997). 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1997). 
10
 Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-13(l)(a) (1997). 
11
 Utah Admin. Code § Rl 51-46b-12(2) (1997). 
12
 Utah Admin. Code §§ R151-46b-12 (1997) and R151-46b-13(l)(a) (1997). 
10 
exception noted above, Agency Review will always constitute the final agency action 
from which a petition for judicial review must follow within 30 days of issuance of an 
Order on Review in order to preserve the appeal. 
"The fundamental and initial inquiry of a court is always to determine its own 
jurisdictional authority over the subject matter of the claims asserted. Upon a 
determination by the court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further 
than to dismiss the action." Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Without the proper filing of a petition for judicial review within 30 days of an 
agency's final agency action under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997) and 63-46b-15 (1997)), the court is without jurisdiction 
to consider the appeal. (Emphasis added). Silva v. Dept. of Employment Security. 786 
P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Bourgeous was clearly instructed in the October 24, 1997 Order on Review that an 
appeal of the decision must be directed to the District Court for judicial review.13 He 
disregarded that instruction and instead elected to file two successive requests for 
13
 Bourgeous claims that the Order on Review was defective in that it failed to comply 
with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c) (1997). Specifically, he claims that 
the order does not contain conclusions of law, notice of further administrative or judicial review 
rights, notice of applicable time limits for appeal, and a statement as to whether the underlying 
decision was affirmed or reversed. In support of his assertion, he provided this Court with the 
first and third pages of a four page order. Pages 2 and 4 are omitted. See Appellants "Exhibit 
D." The complete four page order sent to Bourgeous by the division contains conclusions of law, 
notice of further administrative or judicial review rights, notice of applicable time limits for 
appeal, and a statement dismissing the request for agency review. (See Addendum 3). 
11 
administrative relief, neither of which was authorized in statute or rule. The Order on 
Review issued October 24, 1997 was the Department's final agency action from which 
Bourgeous could judicially challenge the merits of the license denial. The complaint for 
judicial review sought judicial review and relief from the denial of Bourgeous' 
application for licensure as a professional engineer. However, his appeal rights 
extinguished on November 23, 1997, 30 days after the final agency action (the October 
24, 1997 order based upon Agency Review).14 Given Bourgeous' untimely filing of his 
petition for judicial review, the District Court properly ruled that it was without 
jurisdiction to consider the matter. Silva v. Dept. of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 
247 (Utah App. 1990). 
Neither the Utah Administrative Procedures Act nor the Utah Administrative Code 
permit Bourgeous to file more than one request for Agency Review or to petition for 
Agency Reconsideration after receiving Agency Review. His request to reopen Agency 
Review and subsequent petition for Agency Reconsideration cannot be used to create a 
string of agency orders from which appeals are taken so as to preserve or resurrect an 
otherwise extinguished right to judicial review in the District Court. Endorsing such a 
14
 In dismissing Bourgeous' complaint, the District Court ruled that the November 4, 
1997 order, which Judge Nehring called the "order on review," was the Final Agency Action, 
from which Bourgeous had 30 days to judicially appeal. The Division's position is that the 
October 24,1997 order on review was the Final Agency Action from which to appeal. However, 
from whichever order is deemed the "Final Agency Action," Bourgeous' judicial complaint filed 
January 23, 1998 was untimely. 
12 
procedure would allow litigants to receive administrative review after review, each 
challenging the outcome of the preceding review. This process could theoretically 
perpetuate itself indefinitely, thus eliminating any finality to the administrative action. 
In a similar administrative case arising from the Industrial Commission, the Utah 
Court of Appeals concluded that a claimant's successive requests for administrative 
review which were not permitted by statute would not toll the statutorily prescribed time 
for appeal. Ring v. Industrial Commission, Second Fund. 744 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987).15 In Ring the claimant exercised his right to request administrative review 
challenging the decision of a Commission administrative law judge. Following issuance 
of the order denying review, the claimant filed a "Motion for Review Supplement," not 
permitted by statute, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for judicial review 
within 30 days of the order denying an unauthorized motion but beyond 30 days of the 
order denying the authorized motion for Agency Review. The Court concluded that the 
order denying Agency Review (and not the order resulting from the subsequent novel, 
unauthorized motion) was the operative order from which to appeal judicially within 30 
days. It did not matter whether the unauthorized motion was seen as merely an attempt to 
15
 The reasoning in Ring v. Industrial Commission. Second Fund is presented as 
persuasive argument and not as binding precedent. Appellee recognizes that the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act was enacted in 1987, one year after the administrative ruling at 
issue in the Ring decision. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the court is directly on point, and 
consistent with the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
13 
supplement the authorized review: 
[I]n filing a motion for review a claimant has an obligation to 
raise all issues that can be presented at that time. Those issues which are 
not raised are waived. Accordingly, the filing of material which purports to 
"supplement" a motion does not act to revive the motion after is has been 
denied by the adjudicating tribunal. (Citations omitted).16 
The court dismissed the petition for judicial review concluding that "[fjurther 
consideration or action by the Commission which is not permitted by statute will not toll 
the statutorily prescribed time for appeal."17 The court further reasoned: 
Present statutory provisions regarding worker's compensation jurisdiction 
do not allow for subsequent motions to the Commission for review once it 
has disposed of the case on the merits. 
Accordingly, the filing of material which purports to "supplement" a 
motion does not act to revive that motion after it has been denied by the 
adjudicating tribunal. 
Petitioner is entitled to "one bite of the apple" on review.... That 
opportunity cannot be expanded into a multi-course buffet by such devices 
as re-considerations or supplemental filings after a motion for review has 
been denied by the Commission, (citations omitted).18 
Bourgeous urges this Court to adopt a different interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-13 (1997). He asserts that the headings prefacing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 
(1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997) supercede the clear language of § 63-
16
 744 P.2d 602 at 603. 
17
 & 
18
 Id. at 603-604. 
14 
46b-13 (1997) limiting agency reconsideration to cases where agency review is 
unavailable. He urges that Agency Review is "unavailable" for purposes of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997), if it has been used and exhausted. Bourgeous' argument is 
specious. The requirement of unavailability relates to Agency Review, and the subject 
matter reviewed during Agency Review is the Division's order denying licensure. The 
requirement of unavailability of Agency Review therefore relates to the review of the 
merits of the Division's order denying Bourgeous licensure. 
Legislative history dispels any doubt concerning this point. In 1987 the 
Administrative Procedures Act was enacted and § 63-46b-13 of the original act explicitly 
authorized agency reconsideration, even in cases in which agency review was previously 
sought and received. The Administrative Procedures Act, as originally enacted, provided: 
Within ten days after the date that an order on review is issued, or 
within ten days after the date that a final order is issued for which agency 
review is unavailable, any party may file a request for reconsideration, 
stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.... (Emphasis 
added). 
1987 Laws of Utah, Chapter 161, Section 269 (§ 63-46b-13(l)). (Addendum 10). The 
Legislature amended the section in 1988 to read as it is currently found in the 
Administrative Procedures Act, limiting reconsideration to instances where agency 
review is unavailable.19 (Addendum 11) The fact that the legislature originally chose to 
19
 "Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the agency or 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise 
constitute final agency action, any party may file a request for reconsideration with the agency, 
15 
expressly provide for Agency Reconsideration after either Agency Review or "after the 
date that a final order is issued for which agency review is unavailable" clearly 
demonstrates legislative intent that the "unavailable" agency review means unavailable in 
the first instance. If "unavailable" agency review included instances where agency 
review had been utilized and exhausted, as Bourgeous urges, the first clause would be 
redundant of the second. When the legislature chose to amend the section in 1988 to 
eliminate agency reconsideration "[w]ithin ten days after the date that an order on review 
is issued," they clearly evidenced a desire to make agency reconsideration available only 
when agency review was unavailable in the first instance. Any other interpretation of the 
language of the statute would render the legislature's 1988 amendment meaningless. 
Because Agency Review of the Division's order denying Bourgeous licensure was 
available, Bouregous' request for reconsideration was appropriately dismissed by the 
Department for lack of jurisdiction and it cannot now be used to extend the previously 
expired deadline for seeking judicial review. 
Bourgeous9 reliance on dicta in a footnote in Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial 
Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993) is misplaced. This Court was not called 
upon, and therefore did not consider, the issue of whether the Agency Reconsideration 
was appropriate in its holding or in dicta. The issue addressed in footnote 11 in 
stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested." 1988 Laws of Utah, Chapter 72, 
Section 23 (§ 63-46b-13(l)(a)). (See Addendum 11). 
16 
Maverick Country Stores20 was whether a party, otherwise entitled to reconsideration, 
could simultaneously file a motion for Agency Reconsideration and appeal to the courts.21 
This issue is different from a consideration of whether Agency Reconsideration is 
authorized at all. Much more to the point is footnote 9 in Maverick Country Stores not 
cited by Bourgeous: 
As our supreme court has noted in a different setting, if we allow a 
second motion for reconsideration or "re-reconsideration" what is to 
prevent another motion for re-re-reconsideration? Tenacious litigants and 
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically 
[this could go on] ad infinitum. 
Maverick Country Stores, 860 P.2d 944 at 951, n. 9 (Citations omitted). The duplication 
of administrative reviews that concerned this Court in Maverick Country Stores was also 
the concern of the legislature when it amended the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to 
eliminate Agency Reconsideration when Agency Review is available. 
Bourgeous cites, but does not discuss, a plethora of Utah appellate court cases for 
the proposition that, "Utah Courts have repeatedly reviewed, under a de novo standard, 
petitions from agency denials of requests for reconsideration of an earlier final agency 
20860P.2dat951. 
21
 This Court stated,"[ §63-46b-13] provides a petitioner with the option of applying to 
the agency for reconsideration or appealing to the courts. It does not provide petitioner the 
opportunity to pursue both routes concurrently " 
17 
action or 'Agency Review9".22 None of the cases cited by Bourgeous are on point. 
Although each of the cases is an appeal originating from an administrative order on 
agency reconsideration, none of those cases address, directly or in dicta, the issue of 
whether § 63-46b-l3 permits reconsideration where agency review of the merits of the 
order is available. The cases discuss procedural issues, especially issues relating to the 
date upon which the judicial review filing deadline begins to run from a legitimate request 
for reconsideration. They do not, however, support Bourgeous' contention that he was 
entitled to agency reconsideration in this case or that his petition for judicial review is 
timely. 
In only one case cited by Bourgeous did the appellant received both review and 
reconsideration: 49TH Street Galleria v. Tax Commission.23 However, that case is 
distinguishable from the case a bar because the Tax Commission has chosen to establish, 
22
 Evans & Sutherland v. Tax Commission. 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997); Nelson v. Board 
of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997); Newspaper Agency Corp. v. 
Auditing Div. Of Utah State Tax Com'n.. 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997); Visitor Information Center 
Authority of Grand County v. Customer Service Div.. Utah State Tax Com'n.. 930 P.2d 1196 
(Utah 1997); Career Service Review Board v. Department of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 
1997); Utah Association of Counties v. Tax Com'n. Of the State of Utah ex rel. MCI 
Telecommunications Corp.. 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995); Harper Investments v. Auditing Division. 
868 P.2d 813 (Utah 1994); Harrington v. Industrial Commission. 942 P.2d 961 (Utah App. 
1997); Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportation. 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1994); Orton v. 
Utah State Tax Commission. Collection Division. 864 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1994); Knowledge 
Data systems v. Tax Commission. 865 P.2d 1387 (Utah App. 1993); 49th Street Galleria v. Tax 
Commission. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 1993); Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen. 837 P.2d 989 
(Utah App. 1992). 
23
 860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 1993). 
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through its rule making authority, a procedure by which every order prepared by a 
presiding officer is automatically reviewed by the Agency before a Final Agency order is 
entered.24 This automatic review is not the same as the Agency Review contemplated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1997). The automatic review by the Tax Commission is a 
review by the Commission of the findings, conclusions, and order prepared by the 
presiding officer, a designated employee who serves as a hearing officer. Conversely, the 
Agency Review contemplated in § 63-46b-12 (1997) is a post-order review by a superior 
agency of an order issued by an inferior agency.25 The review done by the tax 
commission is further distinguishable because it is automatic without request; it is not an 
elective by either party. Conversely, the review contemplated in § 63-46b-12 (1997) is 
not automatic, it requires that a request be made within 30 days of entry of the order. The 
only elective administrative appeal in Tax Commission decisions is Agency 
24
 Utah Admin. Code § R861-1A-29. Agency Review and Reconsideration Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-13. 
A. Agency Review. 
1. All written decisions and orders shall be submitted by the presiding officer to 
the commission for agency review before the decision or order is issued. Agency Review is 
automatic, and no petition is required. 
B. Reconsideration. Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued, any 
party may file a written request for reconsideration alleging mistake of law or fact, or alleging 
new evidence. 
25
 Agency Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 is distinguishable from 
Agency Reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 because Agency Review is a 
review of an order of an inferior agency by a superior agency, while Agency Reconsideration is a 
reconsideration of an order by the same agency issuing the order. 
19 
Reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997).26 Because the Tax 
Commission has chosen to establish a unique procedure through its rule making authority, 
with both automatic review before orders are entered and elective Agency 
Reconsideration within 20 days after an order is entered, the existence of both prior 
review of orders by the Tax Commission and Agency Reconsideration in 49th Street 
Galleria does not support Bourgeous9 position that he is entitled to both post-order 
Agency Review as contemplated by §63-46b-12 and Agency Reconsideration as 
contemplated by §63-46b-13. 
Bourgeous further argues in the alternative that the Department's action of issuing 
its December 29, 1997 order in response to his request for reconsideration validated the 
request, thus extending the filing deadline for judicial review. He cites 49th Street 
Galleria in support of this position. However, 49th Street Galleria holds that the 30-day 
period for seeking judicial review begins to run on the date the request for reconsideration 
is deemed denied unless an order is issued, in which case the date of the order is the 
operative date. The holding was limited to the "deemed denied" provisions of § 63-46b-
13(3)(b) (1997), which states that a request for reconsideration is deemed denied if not 
responded to by the agency within 20 days of filing. Because the Tax Commission 
provided by rule for automatic Commission review of orders of the presiding officer 
before entry of the order, followed by a right to elective Agency Reconsideration, there 
26
 Supra, note 24. 
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was no issue as to the propriety of the Agency Reconsideration in 49th Street Galleria. 
Nowhere in 49th Street Galleria is it held or suggested that an agency's response to a 
statutorily precluded request for reconsideration validates it and revives an otherwise 
expired opportunity for judicial review. Moreover, the Department did not address the 
merits of Bourgeous' request for reconsideration. The request was summarily denied 
because reconsideration was statutorily precluded and the Department thus lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Department cannot create jurisdiction for a 
reconsideration request by issuing an order holding it lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
request. 
Lastly, § 63-46b-13 (1997) prohibits reconsideration where agency review is 
available and does not give the Department authority or discretion to operate in 
contravention of that requirement. The Department's action in responding to Bourgeous' 
request cannot independently endow jurisdiction where it is statutorily precluded. 
POINT II: THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS LEGALLY 
AND FACTUALLY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
"The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his acts, representations, or 
conduct, or by his silence when he ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts 
exist and such other relies thereon to his detriment." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added), quoting Leaver v. Grose. 610 
21 
P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980). It is not enough to simply rely upon the acts, 
representations, conduct, or silence of another, but the reliance must result in detriment. 
Holland v. Career Service Review Board. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993). 
The "Notice of Right to Appeal" language included in the Department's December 
29, 1997 order states that the order can be challenged by judicial review. From this 
language, Bourgeous argues the Department is estopped from challenging the current 
petition for judicial review as lacking jurisdiction. His analysis and argument, however, 
neglect to consider three dispositive factors. 
First, Bourgeous could not have relied to his detriment upon the order's Notice of 
Right to Appeal language. The Department's October 24, 1997 Order on Review 
dismissing his original request for agency review was the final agency action with respect 
to his license denial. Bourgeous lost his opportunity to judicially challenge the order by 
failing to file a petition for judicial review on or before November 23, 1997, the 30th day 
following the issuance of the order.26 He cannot claim he forewent seeking judicial 
review in reliance on an order that was not issued until December 29, 1997, more than 
26
 In its "Order of Dismissal," the District Court incorrectly identified the date of the 
Department's Order on Agency Review as November 4,1997. The Order on Agency Review 
was actually dated October 24, 1997. The November 4, 1997 order was based upon Bourgeous' 
request to reopen Agency Review, an action not permitted by statute or rule. The thirty day 
deadline to file for judicial review from October 24,1997, was November 23,1997. Despite the 
apparent mistake on dates, it is clear that the District Court found that the Order on Agency 
Review was the final agency action, triggering Bourgeous' 30 day period to seek judicial review. 
Bourgeous' complaint for judicial review was well beyond either date. 
22 
one month beyond the date his right to judicial review expired. Bourgeous did not rely to 
his detriment. 
Second, Bourgeous was fully advised in the Department's October 24, 1997 Order 
on Review that any challenge to the order must be made to the district court within 30 
days.27 He elected to disregard the order's appeal instructions by filing a request to 
reopen agency review on October 30, 1997 and a request for agency reconsideration on 
November 21, 1997. Neither request was permitted by statute or rule, and therefore 
neither request operated to extend the time to file for judicial review. 
Finally, the right to appeal language Bourgeous asserts he relied upon in the 
Department's December 29 ,1997 order states that "[judicial review of this Order may be 
obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the District Court within 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order on Review." (Emphasis added). (See Bourgeous' Complaint, 
Addendum u8"). The Department's December 29th order did not address the merits of the 
license denial, it dismissed Bourgeous' request for reconsideration solely on the basis that 
reconsideration was not permitted by law in his case and the Department lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The complaint requesting judicial review singularly 
challenged the merits of the license denial and did not challenge the Department's finding 
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Bourgeous' request for reconsideration. 
27
 The Department's Order on Agency Review was not defective or deficient in any 
manner. See note 13. 
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Without citing authority, Bourgeous argues that the Department somehow had a 
duty to notify him that Agency Reconsideration was improper in time for him to file a 
timely judicial review. The Department fulfilled its duty to advise Bourgeous of his 
appellate rights in the preceding two orders, which contained notices of his right to appeal 
judicially within 30 days. Bourgeous chose to ignore those notices. 
POINT III: EVEN IF AGENCY RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT EXPRESSLY 
PRECLUDED, RESPONDENT'S REQUEST WAS UNTIMELY. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 requires that a request for Agency Reconsideration be 
made within 20 days "after the date that an order is issued for which review by the agency 
or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable...." The November 21, 
1997, request for reconsideration was only within 20 days of the November 4, 1997 order 
responding to his novel request to reopen agency review, a request which was not 
permitted by statute or rule. Assuming for purposes of argument Bourgeous' request for 
reconsideration filed on November 21, 1997 was statutorily permitted in this case, it was 
filed more than 20 days beyond the Department's October 24, 1997 order dismissing 
Agency Review, which constituted final agency action. 
It should be noted, however, that although the District Court found that the "order 
on agency review" was the final agency action, Judge Nehring identified the date of that 
order as November 4,1997. This appears to be a mistake, because it is clearly contrary to 
24 
the uncontested evidence that the order on agency review was entered October 24,1997. 
The November 4, 1997 order was based upon Bourgeous' request to reopen Agency 
Review, a request with no basis in law. 
Whether or not Bourgeous9 November 21 request for Agency Reconsideration was 
made within 20 days depends upon whether the November 4 or the October 24 order is 
considered the final agency action. Judge Nehring correctly identified the "order on 
agency review" as the final agency action, but he incorrectly identified the date of that 
order as November 4, 1997. Under the reasoning of this court in Maverick Country 
Stores,28 as previously quoted in this brief, the trial court should not give validity to the 
November 4 order based upon Bourgeous' request to reopen Agency Review (for 
"rereview") because there was no basis in law for his request. Bourgeous should not be 
allowed to enlarge the jurisdictional time period for seeking judicial review of the license 
denial by filing a string of untimely and/or unauthorized requests for administrative 
review. Ring v. Industrial Commission. Second Fund, 744 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993).29 
28860P.2d944at951,fn9. 
29
 Supra, note 14. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Department asks that the Court affirm the District 
Court's dismissal of Bourgeous' complaint for judicial review. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J£j_ day of December, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
j£FF,REY C. HONT 
Assistant Attorney General 
26 
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September 24, 1997 
KEITH W BOURGEOUS 
2761 S 3000 W 
SYRACUSE UT 84075 
Dear Mr. Bourgeous: 
DENIAL OF LICENSE: 
Your application for licensure as a Professional Engineer was reviewed and denied for the following: 
1. Failure to document graduation from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering. 
QUESTIONS OR ASSISTANCE: 
If you have questions or need assistance, call: 
Karen McCall, (801) 530-6632 
CHALLENGE AFTER DENIAL OF LICENSURE: 
You may challenge the denial by requesting agency review. If you choose to file a request for agency 
review, you must adhere to the attached procedures. 
Sincerely, 
Karen McCall, Board Secretary 
FOR THE BUREAU MANAGER 
enclosure 
ADDENDUM 2 
October 21,1997 
Keith Wyatt Bourgeous 
2761 So. 3000 W. 
Syracuse, Utah 84075 
Douglas C. Borba, Executive Director 
Utah Department of Commerce 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701 
Dear Sin 
I would like to request an agency review of my recent denial for licensor as a Professional 
Engineer. 
In 19741 graduated from Weber State College with an Associates Degree of Applied Science in 
Electronics. At that time I had also completed an equivalent to a departmental minor in 
chemistry. It became necessary at this time for me to seek full time employment at Phillips 
Petroleum continue my education pan time. 
In 19801 submitted a degree plan to the Electronics Department at Weber State College for a 
Bachelors of Science Degree in Electronics. During my studies it came to my attention that 1 
could gain a Professional Engineering License by completing the proper classes and passing the 
required examinations. Throughout the remainder of my education I was careful to select the 
required classes to meet the State Engineering requirements. 
Upon graduation in 19891 passed the FE Exam, and registered with the State Department of 
Commerce as an engineer in training. Requirements for Professional Licensing were completion 
of 6 years of supervised engineering work and passing the PE exam. 
In June of 19911 was able to transfer to a job that provided at least 50% qualifying time. 
In 1994 during a conversation with the Division of Professional Licencing I was informed they 
had reduced the qualifying time to four years and had eliminated the licensure by experience only. 
And no longer fully accepted the TAC /ABET engineering program. My understanding at this 
time was that my registration as an engineer in training was acceptance of my educational 
requirements. I have received no notification contrary to this and would refer to definition 58-22-
102 10 as a reason for this understanding. 
It states; "Professional engineering intern" means a person who has completed the education 
requirements to become a professional engineer, has passed the fundamentals of engineering 
examination, and is engaged in obtaining tbe four years of qualifying experience for licensure 
under the direct supervision of a licensed professional engineer. 
1 also fed that a review of my college transcripts would indicate that I have credits that would 
meet or exceed those covered by definition Rl 56-22-102-a-i; a bachdors or post graduate degree 
in engineering or equivalent education as determined by the NCEES Foreign Engineering 
Education Evaluation Program and four years of full time engineering experience under 
supervision of one or more licensed engineers; or eight years of experience under supervision of 
one or more licensed engineers; or eight years of full time engineering experience under 
supervision of one or more licensed professional engineers; 
During the summer of 1995 I was able to increase my quafifying time to 100% of time worked. 
The &11 pf 19961 called the State Dept. of Commerce and asked if I could take the PE Exam. 
After confirming my status as an EH [now called a Professional Engineering Intern ] the 
necessary forms were sent to me. 1 passed the PE exam in spring of 1997 and submitted my 
application for Licensure then received notice of denial of licensure due to the dropping of 
TAC/ABET accredited programs in 1992. Although the TAC/ABET curriculum is accepted as 
criteria to take the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination. 
have completed the requirements originally outlined to me by tbe Dept of Commerce and in 
principal meet the current requirements of a professional engineer. 
I would appreciate an earnest review of this request 
Sincerely, 
Keith Wyatt Bourgeous 
ADDENDUM 3 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
KEITH WYATT BOURGEOUS 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
DOPL: Misc 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency review filed 
by Keith Wyatt Bourgeous (hereafter "Petitioner") from an order of the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing (hereafter "Division"). 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether the Petitioner has filed a request for agency review upon which relief 
may be granted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner filed a request for agency review, apparently from the denial by the 
Division of his application for licensure as an Engineer. Petitioner did not furnish a copy of the 
denial letter appealed from, although he was instructed by letter and a copy of the rules that 
perfection of a Request for Agency Review requires the furnishing of the order allegedly wrongly 
entered. 
2. It is impossible from the request for agency review to determine whether the appeal 
was timely filed or the reasons for the Division's determination to deny licensure to Petitioner. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Division's denial letter to Petitioner would have included a copy of the 
Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures Act Rules, along with instructions as to the 
minimal requirements which must be met in order to obtain agency review. Among other things 
the rules provide, in UTAH ADMIN. R151-46b-12: 
(3) Content of a Request for Agency Review and Submission of 
the Record. 
(a) The content of a request for agency review shall be in 
accordance with Subsection 63-46b-12(l)(b). The request for 
agency review shall include a copy of the order which is the 
subject of the request. 
(b) A party requesting agency review shall set forth any factual 
or legal basis in support of that request, including adequate 
supporting arguments and citation to appropriate legal authority 
and to the relevant portions of the record developed during the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) If a party challenges a finding of fact in the order subject to 
review, the party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, that 
the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. A party 
challenging a legal conclusion must support their argument with 
citation to any relevant authority and also cite to those portions of 
the record which are relevant to that issue 
(f) Failure to comply with this rule may result in dismissal 
of the request for agency review. (Emphasis added). 
2. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that he furnish the Executive 
Director with a copy of the order which is being challenged. Without being supplied such basic 
information as the decision and reason that the Division determined that Petitioner was not 
qualified to be licensed to act as an Engineer in the State of Utah, the Executive Director is 
unable to conduct a proper review of the agency's action in denying licensure. 
3. The letter of instruction accompanying Petitioner's denial instructed him that 
"You MUST include with your request a copy of the letter or order you wish reviewed". 
Petitioner chose not to furnish the Executive Director with the information necessary to conduct 
a review of the appeal so it is therefore necessary that the appeal be dismissed. 
ORDER 
The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce having made the above Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is, therefore 
ORDERED that the Request for Agency Review heretofore filed by Keith Wyatt 
Bourgeous is not well taken and the request should be and is hereby dismissed for failure to 
comply with the rules governing agency review. 
SO ORDERED this tha^jjf^day of October, 1997. 
I iG-^U 
DOUGLAS t. BORBA, Executive Director 
y tah Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
District Coun within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on thss /y^ day of October, 1997,1 caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, by certified mail to: 
Keith Wyatt Bourgeous 
2761 S. 3000 West 
Syracuse UT 84075 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
Craig Jackson, Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counsel 
Utah Department of Commerce 
ADDENDUM 4 
October 28, 1997 
Dear Mr. Borba, 
Please find enclosed a copy of my request of agency review. If these items were not 
included in the original request it was an oversight on my part during the mailing or copying 
procedure. I did not knowingly choose to withhold this information. I would ask that you would 
please consider this request its merits. I have included a copy of your original review and have 
included a travel agenda to show that I did not receive notification of the original denial of license 
until Friday, October 3,1997. 
I appreciate your assistance to this point. Thank your for your time and effort. 
Sincerely, 
Keith W. Bourgeous 
ADDENDUM 5 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE AGENCY 
REVIEW OF 
KEITH WVATT BOURGEOUS 
THIS MATTER COMES ON upon the request heretofore filed by Petitioner for further 
consideration of his request for agency review upon which an order was heretofore entered on 
October 24,1997 rejecting the appeal for failure to comply with the rules. In support of his 
request Petitioner states that omission of a copy of the order appealed from had been an oversight 
in the copying and mailing process. 
The order denying Petitioner licensure, issued by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, stated as the reason that Petitioner had not documented graduation from 
an EAC/ABET accredited engineering program as required by the licensing statute. 
Petitioner does oot attempt to establish in his request for review that he possesses the 
statutorily required education, but instead documents a TAC/ABET accredited education which 
ceased being acceptable for licensure on July 1,1996. The amendment establishing the increased 
educational requirements was put into law in 1992, four years prior to its effective date, to 
provide time for persons such as Petitioner possessing a lesser requirement to become licensed 
prior to the effective date of the change. Petitioner's recourse, if any, lies with the legislature 
rather than the administrative division which can only implement the legislative mandates under 
which Petitioner does not qualify for licensure. 
The Executive Director is of the opinion and finds that Petitioner's has stated no grounds 
ORDER 
DOPL: Misc 
sufficient to support his request to reopen consideration of his appeal and the same should be 
denied. It is, therefore 
ORDERED that the request to reopen the Order on Review heretofore entered herein 
should be and is hereby denied. 
SO ORDERED this the of November, 1997. 
L£L 
DOUGL/AfcitX BORBA, Exe^ive Director 
Utah Department of Comma1 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition for Review must 
comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code Annotated. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on ikit/Y^ day of November, 1997,1 caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, by certified 
mail to: 
Keith Wyatt Bourgeous 
2761 S. 3000 West 
Syracuse UT 84075 
MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counse 
Utah Department of Commerce 
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<IBO*-IB83) 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
HBOB-IBBS) 
TO CALL WRITER DIRECT 
(801) 530-7422 
cassbutler@cnmlaw.com 
Douglas C. Borba, Executive Director 
Utah Department of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Box 146701 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701 
Re: Keith W. Bourgeous 
Dear Director Borba: 
Enclosed are the following documents: 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
1. 
4, 1997, 
Request for Agency Reconsideration of an Order issued November 
2. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in support of Request for 
Agency Reconsideration; 
3. Request for Record; 
4. Order dated November 4. 1997. received by Petitioner Keith W. 
Bourgeous, constituting the Order from which this Request for Agency 
Reconsideration is being submitted; and 
5. Request for Oral Argument. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
-r&^ 
CASS BUTLER 
CCB:j bm 
cc: Keith W. Bourgeous 
ADDENDUM 7 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST ORDER ON REVIEW 
FOR AGENCY RECONSIDERATION BY 
KEITH W. BOURGEOUS Case No. DOPL Misc. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request of the Petitioner, Keith 
W. Bourgeous (hereafter "Petitioner"), by and through counsel, for agency reconsideration of the 
denial of his application to be licensed as a professional engineer in the State of Utah by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing (hereafter "Division") and the upholding of 
such denial by the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce (hereafter "Department"). 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of a Division's decision from which agency review is permitted is 
conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code Annotated, and Rule Rl 51-46b-12 of the 
Utah Administrative Code. Agency reconsideration of an order for which agency review is 
unavailable is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-
46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
1 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether Petitioner is entitled to agency reconsideration. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 24,1997 the Division issued a denial letter to Petitioner advising 
him that his application for licensure as a Professional Engineer had been denied because of 
Petitioner's failure to document that he had graduated from an EAC/ABET accredited program in 
engineering. Along with the denial letter the Petitioner was furnished with a letter advising him 
of the minimal requirements necessary to obtain agency review along with a copy of the 
applicable Department rules governing agency review. 
2. On October 23,1997 Petitioner filed a request for agency review but failed to 
follow the Department rules by filing a copy of the order for which review was sought. 
3. On October 24, 1997 the Department issued an Order on Review dismissing 
Petitioner's appeal for failure to comply with the rules governing agency review. 
4. On October 30, 1997 the Petitioner filed a request for reconsideration of the 
Department's dismissal of his appeal which included a copy of the Division's order denying him 
licensure. Petitioner alleged that the failure to include the Division's order had been mere 
oversight on his part and excusable neglect in the copying and mailing process. 
5. On November 4, 1997 the Department issued an Order denying the request to 
reopen the Order on Review as Petitioner stated no grounds upon which relief could be granted. 
The Order cited that the basis for the Division's denial was Petitioner's failure to document 
graduation from an EAC/ABET accredited engineering program and that Petitioner only 
established the possession of a TAC/ABET which failed to meet the requirements put into law in 
1992 to become effective July 1, 1996. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. §63-46b-12( 1 )(a) states that: 
If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any 
adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or 
by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. §63-46b-13(1 )(a) provides that: 
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for 
which review by the agency or by a superior agency under 
Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the 
specific grounds upon which relief is requested. (Emphasis added). 
3. UTAH ADMIN. R151-46b-12(l) states that: 
An aggrieved party may obtain agency review of a final 
order by filing a request with the executive director or the 
department within thirty days following the issuance of the order. 
4. Utah Admin. Rl 51 -46b-13 provides for reconsideration only to the Real Estate 
Appraiser Registration and Certification Board from orders issued by that board. No other 
reconsideration is authorized by such rule. 
5. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act is .clear that reconsideration is available 
only if agency review is unavailable to the aggrieved party from the adverse agency action for 
which review is sought. The Department rules are equally clear that agency review by the 
Executive Director is available from all agency actions taken by the Department's inferior 
agencies and the boards and commissions thereunder with the sole exception of the Real Estate 
Appraiser Registration and Certification Board. 
5. The Order on Review issued by the Department on October 24,1997 contained 
the following: 
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petitioner for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
6. The Order issued by the Department on November 4,1997 in response to 
Petitioner's subsequent filing contained the following notice: 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petitioner for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
7. Agency review is available at the Department level from all actions taken by 
divisions under the Department or any of the boards and commissions operating under the 
auspices of the various divisions, with the sole exception of a single board under the Real Estate 
Division of the Department for which reconsideration exists as the sole appeal available within 
the Department before administrative remedies are exhausted and the aggrieved party becomes 
eligible for judicial review. Therefore, agency reconsideration does not exist from the Orders 
issued by the Executive Director and Petitioner's and Petitioner's recourse, as he was informed 
on two occasions, was to appeal the Department's order to the District Court. 
8. A final order was previously entered by the Executive Director on the issues 
raised by Petitioner herein and this matter no longer resides within the jurisdiction of the 
Department. "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to 
dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1989). 
4 
ORDER 
The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce having made the above Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore 
ORDERED that the Request for Agency Reconsideration heretofore filed by Keith W. 
Bourgeous should be and is hereby dismissed. 
SO ORDERED this th of December, 1997. 
L L 
DOUGLAS C^ORBA, Execupy* Director 
Utah Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for Review 
must comply with Jhe requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code Annotated. 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the^C^tday of December, 1997, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review by certified mail, properly addressed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Cass C. Butler, Esq. 
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough 
Attorneys at Law 
10 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84133 
ATTORNEYS FOR KEITH W. BOURGEOUS 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
J. Craig Jackson, Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MtfCtfftEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counsel 
Utah Department of Commerce 
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ADDENDUM 8 
CASS C. BUTLER (4202) 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Keith W. Bourgeous 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
KEITH W. BOURGEOUS, ) COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS • ) 
) Civil No- 98-0900810 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ) 
) Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiff Keith W. Bourgeous, by way of Complaint, alleges and 
complains of Defendant the Utah Department of Commerce, for cause of 
action, as follows: 
MATURE pf Tffg CASE 
1* This is an action seeking judicial review of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to U.C.A. 53-46b-15(l)(a). 
Plaintiff Bourgeous seeks review of Defendant's Final Agency Decision 
dated December 29, 1997, denying him a license as a Professional 
Engineer in the State of Utah. 
THE PARTIES 
2. Plaintiff Keith W. Bourgeous is a resident of the State 
of Utah with his mailing and primary place of residence at 2761 South 
3000 West, Syracuse, Utah 84 075. 
3. Defendant the Utah Department of Commerce is a Utah 
Agency located at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah- Within 
the Utah Department of Commerce is the Division of Occupational and 
Processional Licensing ("DOPL"). U.C.A. § 58-1-103. DOPL administers 
and enforces all licensing laws of Title 58, including U.C.A. § 58-22, 
regarding engineers and their licenses. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's 
Complaint and review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from the informal adjudicative proceedings against Plaintiff 
pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 63-46b-15 and 78-3-4 (7). 
5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-
13-7. 
Legislative Background 
6. The current version of the Professional Engineers and 
Professional Land Surveyors Licensing Act, as revised, (U.C.A. §58-
22), became effective July 1, 1996, when Governor Leavitt signed into 
force Senate Bill SB-0235, which amended the 1994 version of the Act. 
One of the stated purposes of the licensing amendments to the 1994 
version was to correct certain sunset provisions in the prior law. 
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7. Under the prior law fU.C.A. § 58-22-302 (1994)), an 
applicant qualified for professional engineering license provided he 
or she met one or more of the following: (1) Four years experience, 
(2) an engineering degree from p program accredited by the Technology 
Accreditation Commission/Accreditation Board for Engineering and 
Technology ("TAC/ABET,f) plus 2 years experience, or (3) a degree from 
an Engineering Accreditation Commission/Accreditation Board for 
Engineering Technology ("EAC/ABET") curriculum. In addition, the 
applicant was to have passed the Fundamentals in Engineering 
Examination, the Principals and Practices Examination, the Utah Law 
and Rules Examination, and obtain an additional 4 years of qualifying 
experience under the supervisor of a licensed engineer. 
8. The 1994 law also provided that after July 1, 1996, the 
education requirement could be completed by an EAC/ABET curriculum "or 
equivalent curriculum" approved by the Division in cooperation with 
the Board. However, this part of the 1994 version never became 
effective due to the amendments of 1996 in Senate Bill SB-0235. 
9. The amendments were proposed on January 12, 1996, by 
Senator Craig Petersen. After 6 drafts and other revisions, the bill 
was presented to the Senate Business, Labor and Economic Standing 
Committee. The Standing Committee passed the Bill out favorably on 
February 16, 1996. Senate Bill SB-235 proposed a number of amendments 
to the Engineering Licensing Law, including the admission criteria for 
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taking the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination, which criteria was 
not previously codified. 
10. As a prerequisite to taking the Fundamentals 
Examination, the Amendment required enrollment in or graduation from 
an EAC/ABET or TAC/ABET curriculum (or such other curriculum as may be 
established by the Division in cooperation with the Board) . This 
statutory acceptance of either an EAC/ABET or TAC/ABET curriculum 
remained consistent throughout all of the bill's subsequent drafts, 
despite the Committee's modifications to such things as whether or not 
Utah would grant reciprocity to out of state engineers, whether an 
applicant would have to establish good moral character, etc. 
11. The final version of SB-2035 which passed the Committee 
and was signed into law by the Governor, provided that the education 
requirement for a professional engineering license would be: "an 
earned Bachelors or Masters Degree from an engineering program meeting 
criteria established by Rule by the Division in collaboration with the 
Board". U.C.A. §58-22-302(d). The final version also included the 
EAC/ABET or TAC/ABET accreditation curriculum. 
12. Over two months after the new Amendments (effective 
September 17, 1996), the Department of Commerce and DOPL promulgated 
R156-22, "Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors 
Licensing Act Rules." The new regulation did not recognize TAC/ABET 
degrees or other degrees meeting criteria established by the "Division 
in Collaboration with the Board." 
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13. In addition, the new regulation R156-22-202 (2), 1996)# 
sought to protect those who were "unsuccessful in obtaining licensure 
by experience before July 1, 1996" by not requiring such applicants to 
repeat their pre-July 1, 1994 supervised experience once they had 
obtained an EAC/ABET degree. 
STATEMENT OF ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF 
14. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(2)(a)(viii), Plaintiff 
Bourgeous is entitled to relief because (a) his application for a 
professional engineer license should have been evaluated by defendant 
under the pre-July 1, 1996 requirements which recognized TAC/ABET 
accredited engineering degrees inasmuch as Plaintiff received his 
engineer-in-training certificate and commenced his qualifying 
experience before the July 1, 1996 change; (b) Defendant and DOPL have 
treated Plaintiff unfairly and differently than other professional 
engineer applicants; and (c) Defendant and DOPL's denial of 
Plaintiff's application and Rule R156-22-201 are based upon an 
erroneous interpretation of U.C.A § 58-22-302 and 306 (1996), which 
require the acceptance of a TAC/ABET accredited engineering degree. 
FIRST CAUSE OP ACTION 
(Violation of TT.C.A. S 63-46b-14 (4) (d)) 
15• On June 9, 1989, Plaintiff Bourgeous received a 
Bachelors of Science in Electrical Engineering Technology from Weber 
State University. Plaintiff Bourgeous's Engineering Degree was in an 
accredited program recognized by TAC/ABET. 
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16. Later that year Plaintiff applied with DOPL to take the 
Fundamentals in Engineering Examination ("FEf!) offered by the National 
Assessment Institute. On October 29, 1989, Plaintiff Bourgeous 
received a>passing score on the FE exam. 
17. Plaintiff Bourgeous also applied in 1989 with the Utah 
Department of Commerce and was given an Engineer-in-Training 
Certificate. The Certificate No. 9451-0999-0 was issued pursuant to 
the then applicable Department of Commerce Regulation R153-22-2(c) 
which stated that the Certificate was valid for 10 years without 
renewal. 
18. After receiving the Engineer-in-Training Certificate, 
Plaintiff Bourgeous commenced working on the requirement of qualifying 
experience under the supervision of a licensed engineer. In June of 
1991, Plaintiff Bourgeous accepted a new job which provided only 50% 
of qualifying time towards the then 6 years required for licensure 
under P.C.A. § 58-22-5 (1990). 
19. Plaintiff Bourgeous continued working on his qualifying 
time and completed the necessary years of experience in 1997 (2 years 
before his Engineer-in-Training Certificate No. 9451-0999-0 would have 
expired), whereupon he applied to take the NCEES Principles and 
Practices Engineering Examination. 
20. On April 18, 1997, Plaintiff Bourgeous received a 
passing score on the Principles and Practices Engineering Exam. 
- 6 -
Plaintiff Bourgeous' application for license was received by DOPL on 
September 2, 1997. 
21. By letter dated September 24, 1997# DOPL denied 
Plaintiff Bourgeous' application for "failure to document graduation 
from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering.11 
Plaintiff Bourgeous subsequently sought Agency Review on October 21, 
1997. 
22. On October 24, 1997, Defendant the Utah Department of 
Commerce dismissed Plaintiff Bourgeous' request on the grounds for 
"failure to comply with the rules governing agency review." Upon 
further consideration, the Agency denied on November 4, 1997, a 
request "to reopen the Order". 
23. Plaintiff Bourgeous subsequently requested agency 
reconsideration of the denial and on December 29, 1997, Defendant 
denied and dismissed the request, which denial exhausted Plaintiff's 
administrative remedies. A copy of the December 19, 1997 Denial is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated by reference. 
24. Under the Department's regulation applicable in 1989 
(R153-22-2), Plaintiff Bourgeous met the educational requirements for 
an Engineer-in-Training certification. At that time a degree in 
Engineering Technology was not considered to be an engineering degree 
for purposes of the Certificate and DOPL required that the applicant 
complete 2 years of engineering experience prior to application to 
take the Engineer-in-Training examination. However, degrees in 
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engineering at a Utah College or University including chemical 
engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, etc., were 
recognized as fulfillment of the educational requirements. (See R153-
22-2(a) (1) (a) (1989)). Plaintiff Bourgeous met the educational 
requirements because he had earned an electrical engineering degree. 
25. The then applicable regulation also provided than an 
Engineer-in-Training Certificate was not subject to renewal and was 
valid for 10 years from the date the examination was passed (R153-22-
2(c) (1989)) . 
26. Once awarded the Engineer-in-Training Certificate, 
Plaintiff Bourgeous was deemed to have completed the then applicable 
educational requirements for licensure and only needed to complete his 
work experience and pass the PE examination. 
27. By failing to recognize Plaintiff Bourgeous' completion 
of the educational requirements for licensure as met by the Engineer-
in-Training Certificate, the Department has acted improperly and has 
effectively eviscerated Plaintiff Bourgeous' 10 year Engineer-in-
Training Certificate previously awarded to him by DOPL. 
28. The Defendant and DOPL's denial of Plaintiff Bourgeous' 
application for professional licensure was improper and violated the 
Standards under U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(d> and therefore should be 
reversed. 
29. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is 
more fully set forth in his prayer for relief. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of TJ.C.A. 5 63-46b-16 (4) (h) (iii)) 
30. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all 
of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 29 of this Complaint. 
31. Defendant and DOPL denied licensure to Plaintiff 
Bourgeous because they treated his application as not being filed 
prior to July 1, 1996. Yet, in the case of John P. Hunter, the 
Department took a different position. 
32. Mr. Hunter did not have a EAC/ABET degree either and 
also made final application after July 1, 1996. Yet, the Department 
treated Mr. Hunter's earlier application (presumably his application 
for the FE exam and to be an intern), as the applicable application 
for commencing the licensure process. In so doing, the Defendant 
stated, 
The problem in this case was that your client [Mr. 
Hunter] filed a new application rather than 
amending his old one. When he filed the appealed 
application he did not qualify under the law now 
in effect. 
33. The Department went on to reason in Mr. Hunter's case 
that he should have been considered under the old law which permitted 
TAC/ABET degrees because his "initial application" was before July 1, 
1996. Like Mr. Hunter, Plaintiff Bourgeous's initial application was 
before July 1, 1996, yet the Department has treated Plaintiff 
Bourgeous differently than Mr. Hunter. 
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engineering at a Utah College or University including chemical 
engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, etc., were 
recognized as fulfillment of the educational requirements. (See R153-
22-2(a) (1) (a) (1989)). Plaintiff Bourgeous met the educational 
requirements because he had earned an electrical engineering degree. 
25. The then applicable regulation also provided than an 
Engineer-in-Training Certificate was not subject to renewal and was 
valid for 10 years from the date the examination was passed (R153-22-
2(c) (1989)) . 
26. Once awarded the Engineer-in-Training Certificate, 
Plaintiff Bourgeous was deemed to have completed the then applicable 
educational requirements for licensure and only needed to complete his 
work experience and pass the PE examination. 
27. By failing to recognize Plaintiff Bourgeous' completion 
of the educational requirements for licensure as met by the Engineer-
in-Training Certificate, the Department has acted improperly and has 
effectively eviscerated Plaintiff Bourgeous' 10 year Engineer-in-
Training Certificate previously awarded to him by DOPL. 
28. The Defendant and DOPL's denial of Plaintiff Bourgeous' 
application for professional licensure was improper and violated the 
Standards under U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) and therefore should be 
reversed. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more 
fully set forth in his prayer for relief. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of P.C.A. S 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)) 
29. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all 
of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint. 
30. Defendant and DOPL denied licensure to Plaintiff 
Bourgeous because they treated his application as not being filed 
prior to July 1, 1996. Yet, in the case of John P. Hunter, the 
Department took a different position. 
31. Mr. Hunter did not have a EAC/ABET degree either and 
also made final application after July 1, 1996. Yet, the Department 
treated Mr. Hunter's earlier application (presumably his application 
for the FE exam and to be an intern), as the applicable application 
for commencing the licensure process. In so doing, the Defendant 
stated, 
The problem in this case was that your client [Mr. 
Hunter] filed a new application rather than 
amending his old one. When he filed the appealed 
application he did not qualify under the law now 
in effect. 
32. The Department went on to reason in Mr. Hunter's case 
that he should have been considered under*the old law which permitted 
TAC/ABET degrees because his "initial application" was before July 1, 
1996. Like Mr. Hunter, Plaintiff Bourgeous's initial application was 
before July 1, 1996, yet the Department has treated Plaintiff 
Bourgeous differently than Mr. Hunter. 
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WHEREFORE, the Defendant has violated U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(iii) 
by acting in a manner contrary to prior practices, and Plaintiff 
Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully set forth in his prayer for 
relief. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of U.C.A. S 63-46b-16(4)(a) and (b)) 
33. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all 
of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 32 of this Complaint. 
34. Under U.C.A. §58-22-302 the EAC/ABET and TAC/ABET 
curriculums are treated equally for purposes of taking the 
Fundamentals of Engineering Examination. The State Legislature made 
no distinction between the two curriculums. Furthermore, at no place 
in the Statute did the State Legislature state that a TAC/ABET 
curriculum would be unacceptable in meeting the education requirements 
for licensure. 
35. By recognizing the TAC/ABET curriculum as acceptable 
and on equal footing with an EAC/ABET curriculum for purposes of 
taking the Professional Engineering Examination, the State Legislature 
has implicitly required the Department of Commerce and DOPL to 
recognize such a curriculum as well, consistently throughout all 
requirements for licensure. 
WHEREFORE, Rule 156-22-201 which recognizes only an EAC/ABET 
engineering program and not also a TAC/ABET engineering program is in 
direct violation and contradiction of the Statute and Plaintiff 
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Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully set forth in his prayer for 
relief. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of U.CA. § 63-46b-16(4) (g) > 
36. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all 
of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 35 of this Complaint. 
37. Defendant's actions are based upon a determination of 
facts which are not supported by substantial evidence in violation of 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16U) (g). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully 
set forth in his prayer for relief. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of U.C.A. S 63-46b-16(4) (h) (i)) 
38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all 
of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 37 of this Complaint. 
39. Defendant's actions abuse the discretion delegated to 
Defendant by Statute and are in violation of U.C.A^ § 63-46b-
16(4) (h) (i) • 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully 
set forth in his prayer for relief. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Arbitrary and Capricious) 
40. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all 
of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint. 
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Defendant's actions are arbitrary and capricious, in 
violation of U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully 
set forth in his prayer for relief. 
PLAYER roy rogy 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands judgment in his favor and 
against Defendant the Utah Department of Commerce as follows: 
1. That pursuant to the First Cause of Action, this Court 
enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering 
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in 
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an 
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
2. That pursuant to the Second Cause of Action, this Court 
enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering 
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in 
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an 
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
3. That pursuant to the Third Cause of Action, this Court 
enter judgment against Defendant by Striking as unconstitutional and 
contrary to Statute Defendant's Regulation R156-22, and entering 
judgment against Defendant in an amount to be determined at trial, 
together with all costs, plus a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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4- That pursuant to the Fourth Cause of Action, this Court 
enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering 
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in 
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an 
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
5* That pursuant to the Fifth Cause of Action, this Court 
enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff arid against Defendant by Ordering 
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in 
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an 
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a 
reasonable attorney's fee, 
6. That pursuant to the Sixth Cause of Action, this Court 
enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering 
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in 
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an 
amount to be .determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a 
reasonable attorneys ree. 
Dated this / O ~"dav of January, 199*8. 
Cat* %cr4<i 
CASS C. BUTLER 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bourgeous 
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ADDRESS OF PLAINTIFF: 
2761 South 3000 West 
Syracuse, Utah 84075 
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ADDENDUM 9 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN (#5594) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (#1231) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Counsel for the Defendant 
160 East 300 South 
Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801) 366-0310 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH W. BOURGEOUS, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, : 
Civil No. 980900810 
Defendant. : Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
The above entitled matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff s Complaint requesting judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15( 1 )(a). The 
Court having reviewed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and all responsive memoranda thereto, and 
having heard oral argument by both parties at hearing on June 5,1998, hereby finds and orders as 
follows: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third .indicia! District 
JUL 2 2 \m 
SALT LAK&<50UNTY 
By. tS 
' C*puty UerK 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On September 2,1997, Plaintiff applied with the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing (Division) of the Department of Commerce (Department) for licensure as a professional 
engineer. The license application was denied by the Division on September 24, 1997 for "failure 
to document graduation from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering." On 
October 21,1997, Plaintiff requested "agency review' with the Department under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-12. 
On October 24,1997, the Department issued its Order on Review denying Plaintiffs request 
for relief. The Department's order advised Plaintiff he could seek judicial review of the order 
through filing a petition for judicial review in the district court within 30 days of its issuance. 
Plaintiff nevertheless elected to file a supplemental request with the Department on October 30,1997 
requesting that agency review be reopened for consideration of additional information not included 
in the original request. The Department issued an other order on November 4, 1997, denying 
Plaintiffs request to reopen agency review. Although the Order advised Plaintiff of his right to seek 
judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15, it did not offer "agency reconsideration" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 as an appeal option. 
Plaintiff petitioned the Department on or about November 21, 1997 for agency 
reconsideration challenging the November 4, 1997 Order on Review. The Department dismissed 
the request for agency reconsideration on December 29, 1997 for lack of jurisdiction. On January 
2 
23, 1998, Plaintiff filed for judicial review in this Court challenging the merits of the Division's 
September 24, 1997 decision to deny Plaintiffs license application. 
DISCUSSION 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires that written orders on agency review 
include, among other things, "a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or 
judicial review available to aggrieved parties." (Emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
12(6)(c)(vii). The Order on Review entered by the Department on November 4, 1997 notified 
Plaintiff of his right to seek judicial review by filing a petition for review in the District Court within 
30 days of the order as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and § 63-46b-l 5. The order did not 
impose any requirement or inform him of any right to seek agency reconsideration under Utah Code 
Ann. 63-46b-13. From the November 4,1998 Order on Review, Plaintiff enjoyed a 30 day window 
within which to seek judicial review. Rather than pursue judicial review within this time period, 
Plaintiff elected to file with the Department a petition for agency reconsideration under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-13(l). However, agency reconsideration, as defined in § 63-46b-13, was not 
available to Plaintiff as a means of administrative relief on account he had previously sought and 
received agency review under § 63-46b-12. The language in § 63-46b-13(l)(a) explicitly states that 
agency reconsideration is available as an administrative appellate option only in cases where agency 
review under § 63-46b-12 is unavailable. 
Plaintiffs election to seek agency reconsideration does not act to toll the 30 day period in 
which he was required to file for judicial review in the district court since he had no right to seek 
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reconsideration. Plaintiffs contention that the heading to § 63-46b-13 reading, "Agency review-
Reconsideration," reflects the Legislature's intent to authorize reconsideration where agency review 
is available is unpersuasive. The title of an act cannot be used "to create an ambiguity or uncertainty 
when the language of the body of the act is clear." Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co..414 
P.2d 963, 964-65 (Utah 1966). Because there existed no right to seek agency reconsideration, 
Plaintiffs filing of his request for reconsideration does not toll the running of the 30 day filing 
period for judicial review, nor does the Department's order denying Plaintiffs improper request for 
reconsideration revive a right to seek judicial review or create a new right of review. 
Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that the Department is estopped from challenging the untimeliness 
of his request for judicial review on account of its December 29,1997 order which informed him he 
could appeal the order through judicial review is unpersuasive. Plaintiff fails set out the facts which 
satisfy the elements of an estoppel claim against a state agency. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to 
establish he relied on the Department's Order to his detriment, Holland v. Career Service Review 
Board. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993); and he fails to establish that the requested relief will not 
substantially effect public policy in a adverse manner, and that injustice will result in the absence 
of relief. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiffs Complaint requesting judicial review was filed on January 23,1998, more than 
30 days beyond the Department's Order on Review. Accordingly, the Complaint was filed untimely 
and the Court is without jurisdiction to consider the matter. 
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For the reasons and upon the grounds set forth above and in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
it is hereby: 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted and Plaintiffs request for judicial 
review is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this J ^ d a y of ^(JuLu^ 1998. 
Cass C. Butler 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 10 
Ch. 161 Laws of Utah 1987 
(vil) a notice of any right eTrgfThcr administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggr-
ieved parties; and 
(viii) the lime limits applicable to any appeal or 
f f V1CW. 
Section 269. SectftM Ended. 
Section 63-466-13. Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
it enacted to read: 
4V46k-13. Agency review • Reconsideration. 
(1) Within ten days after the date that an order 
on review is issued, or within ten days after the date 
that a final order is issued for which agency review 
Is unavailable, any party may file a written request 
for reconsideration, stating the specific grounds 
upon which relief is requested. Unless otherwise 
provided by statute, the filing of the request is not a 
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order 
or the order on review. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail 
to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated 
for that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request, the request for 
rehearing shall be considered to be denied. 
Section 270. Section Enacted. 
Section 63~46b~14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
to read: 
63-46b-14. Jadidal review • fj&aastion of 
administratrvc i 
(DA party aggrieved may obtain judicial review 
of final agency action except in actions where judT 
cia) review is expressly prohibited by statute, only 
after exhausting all administrative remedies avail-
able, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review peed pot 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or 
any other statute states that exhaustion is not requ-
ired; • 
(b) the court may relieve a parry seeking judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: 
~-+r 4i) the administrative remedies"af e"feadequateroT 
(ID cxnausrion of remedies would result in irrep-
arable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion. 
C2) (a) A party shall fDe a petition for judicial 
review of final agency anion within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued. 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and shall 
meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
1271. Section Enacted. 
Section 6M6V15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read: 
63-466-15. Judicial review . informal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction 
to review by trial de novo all final agency action 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, 
except that final agency action from informal adj-
udicative proceedings based on a record shall be 
reviewed by the district courts on the record accor-
ding to the standards of Subsection 63-46b-16 
ill: 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudi-
cative proceedings shall be as provided in the statute 
governing the agency or, in the absence of such a 
venue provision, in the county where the petitioner 
resides or maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint gove-
rned by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall 
include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party 
seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respon-
dent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to 
be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, 
summary, or brief description of the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties 
"in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to 
the agency action; 
fv) a copy of the written agency order from the 
DfOI informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking 
judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and 
extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner 
is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleading and proceedings in the 
district court are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall 
determine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial 
proceedings under this section. 
Section 272. Section Enacted. 
U- Section 63-466-16, Utah Code-Annotated 1953. 
is enacted to read: 
63-466-16, Jadidal review . Formal adjudicative 
(1) The Supreme Court or other appellate court 
designated by statute has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) (a) To seek judicial review «f final areng 
action resulting from formal adj"^'^"yg proceed; 
ings. the petitioner shall file a per«"rtn fnT review oj 
agency action in the form required bv the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ft) The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedug 
govern ail additional filings and proceedings mjng 
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ADDENDUM 11 
Laws of U t a h - 1 Ch.72 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written re-
quest for renew within [ten] 28 dayi after the issu-
ance of the order with the person or entity desig-
natad for that purpose by the statute or rule. 
(fc) Tlie request shall: 
ftft)](i) be signed by the party eer ring renew; 
ftbHCii) state the groundf for renew and the relief 
requested; 
[fe)](iiD state the date upon which it was mailed; 
and 
ftdttftx) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing dak of the re-
m i t for WVMW. ttr within fn# *m» period provided 
bv ajgnev rale. wnirWgr it )anf*r. any party mif 
file a response with the person designated by stat-
uts or ruk to rsoerfe the response. One copy of the 
rerpoiJMsbjdlbesentbymsiltoee^ofthepeTtiee 
and la the presiding officer. 
(8) If s statute or the agsncys rules require re* 
nsw of an order by the agency or a superior agency, 
the agency or superior agency shall renew the order 
within a reasonable time or within the time re-
quired by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) lb assist in renew, the agency or superior 
afsncymsybycTO^crnilepeTTmtth^psrtieetofile 
briefr or other papers, or to conduct oral argument 
(6) Notice ofheartngion renew shall be mailed to 
all parties. 
16) (a) Within a rsaeonsMe time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on renew. 
(b) Tlie order on renew shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the agency 
far that purpose and shall be mailed to each party. 
<e) The order on renew shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting 
or requiring renew; 
(ii) a statement of the issues renewed; 
(nD findings of met as to each of the issues re-
newed; 
(fcr) wmrhisione of law as to each of the issues re-
neww 
(T) the reasons liar the disposition; 
to) whethartbs decision of the presiding officer 
or agency is to be sffirmsd, reversed, or modified, 
•nd whether all or any portion of the adjudicative 
proserin if is to be remanded; 
(•ii) a notice of any right of further administra-
tive rseonsidsration or judicial renew available to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(•Hi) the time limits applicable to any appeal or 
renew. 
Section 28. Section Amended. 
Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
68-46b-18. Agency review—Reconsider* 
tion. 
(l)(aj Within [tea days after the dote the* en er 
der en review ie issued, ei» within tew] 2Q days after 
the date that [s-finei] an order IM issued for which 
[agency] review by the agency or by i wpcrior 
Myenrv undff fi^rm 63-*6h-l2 ii unavailable, 
and if th« nrder would otherwise cnnrtitiit*. final 
ag»nrv action, anv party mav file a written reggaet 
ibr reconsideration with thm agency, stating the spe-
cific groundf upon which relief is requested. 
(hi) UnleM otherwuw provided by statute, the fil-
ing of the request ii not s prerequisite for eeekingju-
dicial renew of the order [st she order en loviowl. 
(2) Ths request for rsconsidsrstion shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
each party by the person making ths request 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated 
for that purpose, shall issue a written order grants 
ing ths request or denying the request 
(b) If ths agency heed or the person designated far 
that purpose does not issue an order within 20 days 
after the filing of the request, the request for [re-
hearing] Bflonsidratioii shall be considered to be 
denied. 
Section 24. Section Amended. 
tiection*3-46b-14, Utah Code AiinotateTtfti 
as enacted by Chapter 161, Lews of Utah 1987, ii 
amended to read: 
«-46b-14. Judicial iwriew—Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain Judicial revise 
of final agency action, except in actions where judi 
dal review is sxprsssly prohibited by statutedL 
fg) Apurtvmiv'WV fodfeiel i»vfowonlyafterax 
haustingall administrativs remedies available, ex 
osptthat' 
(a) a party peeking judicial review need not ex-
haust administrative remedies if this chapter or 
any other statute states that exhaustion is not re-
quired; 
(b) the court may relieve a party leering judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all ad-
ministrative rstnediee if: 
(i) the admimstratrfs ramediee are inadequate; 
(ii) nrt* i"***"'" ^ fj^fAimm —~*\A «—«!» <» «wp«. 
rable harm disproportionate to ths public benefit 
derived from requiring sxhaustigj^ 
KMOXft) ApsrtyshslJn^spetitionfbrjudidsl 
renew of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order oonstjtutinf tfrafiral agency 
»<* imia iaanadOTi immdf t i^ t f tha™fr^f^ i«d 
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